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This paper analyzes the connection between the asymmetric tax treatment of home-
owners and landlords and the progressivity of income taxation using a quantitative
overlapping generations general equilibrium model with housing and rental markets.
Our model emphasizes the determinants of tenure choice (own vs. rent) and the house-
hold decision to supply housing services to the rental market. This formulation breaks
the link between the rental price and the equilibrium interest rate and, hence, the
aggregate supply of rental property responds diﬀerently to the direction of rental price
changes, marginal tax rate changes, and maintenance cost changes. We show that the
model replicates the key factors and the distributional patterns of ownership, house
size, and landlords. The degree of progressivity in the income tax code has important
implications for housing tenure and housing consumption. We ﬁnd a movement toward
a less progressive income tax code can generate sizeable increases in homeownership
and welfare that result from the equilibrium eﬀects and a portfolio reallocation mech-
anism absent in economies with a single asset (i.e. Conesa and Krueger (2006)). An
examination of the removal of existing asymmetries in the tax code are found to have
eﬀects on housing that diﬀer from those reported in the literature. We show that hous-
ing policy can increase the ownership rate of a particular segment of the population,
but generate nontrivial distributional costs. The welfare increases are no larger than
those found when the progressivity of the tax code is reduced.
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1Introduction
The use of the tax code to promote owner-occupied housing dates back to the Civil War
era. The most prominent provisions of the current tax code argued to impact housing are:
the deductibility from taxable income of mortgage interest payments and property taxes;
the exclusion of the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing from taxable income;
and the special treatment of capital gains upon the sale of the house. The tax treatment of
owner-occupied housing introduces a wedge into the decision to invest in housing relative to
real capital as well as the decision on homeownership relative to renting. The impact of tax
policy on these margins has been studied by many authors. For example, Laidler (1962),
Aaron (1972), and Rosen (1972) employ Harberger methods for measuring excess burden to
examine the eﬃciency losses of tax policy.1 Other authors have used a general equilibrium
approach to study this issue. Berkovec and Fullerton (1992) employ a static disaggregated
general equilibrium model to study the implications of tax policy for housing and portfolio
choices. They ﬁnd that when all the tax advantages to homeownership are disallowed, the
total quantity of owner housing consumption decreases by three to six percent as well as
the fraction of owners. The beneﬁts to homeowners from the mortgage interest rate and
property tax deduction are found to be minimal. Gervais (2002) examines the taxation of
housing in the context of a dynamic life-cycle economy with housing rental services provided
by a rental ﬁrm. He ﬁnds that mortgage interest deductions or the taxation of imputed rents
have very small distributional eﬀects from a long-run perspective.
Most studies have ignored two important dimensions that can have implications for the
quantitative assessment of these asymmetries. The ﬁrst dimension is the responsiveness of
the supply of rental property since renting is the alternative to owning. We argue that hous-
ing investment decisions are joint with the decision on how to use the services generated
from this investment. Empirical evidence from the Property Owners and Managers Survey
of the Census Bureau indicates that households or non-institutional proprietors own most of
the rental property. Existing studies, in general, ignore this margin which has implications
for rental supply responses by assuming a perfectly inelastic supply of rental services or a
’stand-in’ rental ﬁrm with a perfectly elastic supply. With either speciﬁcation changes in
the asymmetric treatment of owner-occupied housing via income taxation have no eﬀect in
the supply of rental property.2 We argue that this is not necessarily the case in a model
where aggregate rental supply has a positive slope and there is endogenous entry/exit into
this market. The second dimension is that the asymmetries in the tax treatment of housing
can be magniﬁed in the presence of nonlinear income taxation. Households can use housing
consumption/investment goods to aﬀect the marginal tax rate. In addition, since all land-
lords face diﬀerent marginal tax rates their supply of rental units responds in a non-trivial
manner to changes in the rental price. That includes changes in the number of rental units
supplied by a given landlord as well as a change in the number of households that choose
1Aaron (1972) estimates the extent to which households’ liability would change if the imputed net rent
would be taxed. He ﬁnds that tax liabilities as a percentage of gross income would increase. While there is
some tendency for this to be increasing in income, it is certainly not monotonic. One of the limitations of
the approach it that assumes that gross imputed rents are independent of changes in the tax code.
2With a stand-in ﬁrm an arbitrage condition ties the rental price to the interest rate and the depreciation
rate of rental property. In equilibrium, the net return on rental investment should be equal to the return on
capital and the stock of rental-occupied housing is entirely determined by the demand for rental property.
More importantly, only housing policies that aﬀect maintenance cost will have an impact on the equilibrium
rental price.
2to rent property. The strategic component is relevant not to only understand the impact of
housing policy in housing tenure and investment decisions, but changes in income taxation.
T h eo bj e c t i v eo ft h i sp a p e ri st w of o l d .F i r s t ,w ee x a m i n et h ei m p a c to ft h ea s y m m e t r i e so f
the tax treatment of owner and rental-occupied housing in the presence of nonlinear taxation.
These asymmetries are introduced by allowing mortgage interest payments to be deductible
from taxable income, and the exclusion of the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing
from taxable income. Second, we explore the determinants of the supply of rental property
and its response to the existing tax provisions, changes in the progressivity of the tax code,
and to alternative housing policies designed to increase the number of households that own
the housing.
In order to analyze the posed issues, we construct a quantitative general equilibrium
overlapping generations model with housing. Households face uninsurable labor income, life
uncertainty, and borrowing constraints. They make decisions with respect to consumption of
goods and housing services. Housing investment is part of the household’s portfolio decision
and diﬀers from capital investment along several dimension. Housing investment is lumpy
and indivisible, is subject to idiosyncratic capital gains shocks, requires a downpayment and
long-term mortgage ﬁnancing, and is subject to diﬀerential tax treatment. Households have
the option to purchase housing services in the rental market. Mortgage loans are available
from a ﬁnancial sector that receives deposits from households and also loans capital to
private ﬁrms. The production sector considers neoclassical ﬁrms that use capital and labor
to produce a consumption/investment good and housing. The government has the role of
taxing income and providing retirement beneﬁts through a social security system and funds
some exogenous level of expenditure. Income taxes are distortionary, especially as they
pertain to mortgage ﬁnance. We estimate the structural parameters of the model to match
certain moments in the U.S. economy. We show that the model replicates the key factors
and the distributional patterns of housing ownership, housing consumption, and distribution
of landlords.
The primary ﬁndings in this paper are:
• Modeling the supply of rental housing services as part of the household decision problem
breaks the link between the rental price and the equilibrium interest rate. As a result,
we ﬁnd that the aggregate supply of rental property responds diﬀerently to the direction
of rental price changes, marginal tax rate changes, and maintence cost changes. The
rental ﬁrm paradigm does not capture these eﬀects.
• The degree of progressivity in the income tax code has important implications for hous-
ing tenure and housing consumption. We ﬁnd a negative and quantitatively signiﬁcant
relationships between the progressivity in the income tax code and homeownership and
housing consumption. A reduction in the marginal tax rate even in the presense of
the deductibility mortgage interest payments reduces the incentives to purchase larger
housing units. In equilibrium, households increase saving which causes the interest
rate to fall and average income increases. The income eﬀect in conjunction with a
lower mortgage rate allow young and low income households to purchase a house. The
impact of the asymmetries in the tax code is minimized through a less progressive
system welfare increases.
• We ﬁnd that the welfare gains associated with a decrease in the progressivity of the
income tax code are much larger than the gains reported in Conesa and Krueger (2006).
3This suggests that the importance of income tax reforms are ampliﬁed in the presence
of housing.
• The taxation of the imputed rental income from owner-occupied housing has a small
but positive eﬀect on housing consumption and increase the aggregate ownership rate.
This result is due to our assumption that policy changes be revenue neutral combined
with the rental supply response. These ﬁndings are in contrast with Berkovic and
Fullerton (1992) and Rosen and Rosen (1980). If we hold prices constant, we ﬁnd
results similar to Rosen and Rosen’s partial equilibrium results. This highlights the
importance of a general equilibrium approach in this context.
• We ﬁnd that the elimination of the mortgage interest deduction slighly reduces the
consumption of owner-occupied housing, but has a positive eﬀect on homeownership.
This result is a consequence of the rental property supply response and the beneﬁts from
tax reduction that follows from the revenue neutrality assumption. These results diﬀers
from the ﬁndings of Rosen (1980) and Gervais (2002) who estimate an elimination of
the mortgage interest deduction would reduce in the aggregate ownership rate, but
supports Glaesser and Shapiro (2002) conjecture that this policy has a small, but not
negative impact, in homeownership.
• We show that housing policy can increase the ownership rate of a particular segment
of the population, but generates non-trivial distributional costs in terms of welfare.
We consider two diﬀerent housing policies designed to reduced the diﬃculty that some
families have in accumulating a downpayment. We ﬁnd that certain policies of this
type can increase the homeownership rate and be welfare enhancing. However, the
welfare increases are no larger than those found when the progressivity of the tax code
is reduced.
This paper is organized into ﬁve sections. In the ﬁrst section, we present some empirical
facts that surround the decision to become an owner of rental property. The next section
develops our model economy and explains how we estimate the model using calibration
targets from the US economy. In the third section, we explore the determinants of the rental
supply and decompose the intensive and the extensive margins. The fourth section employs
the model economy to measure the eﬀectiveness of these provisions, and its impact to changes
in the degree of progressivity of income taxation. In the ﬁfth section we evaluate the welfare
implications of alternative housing policies. The ﬁnal section concludes.
1 Empirical Evidence Rental Markets
The modeling decision on how rental housing services are provided to the marketplace has
implications for tax policy analysis. We argue that the decision to supply rental property
is entwined with the decision to invest in housing and the decision to consume housing
services. Tax policy introduces wedges into these decisions creating implications for the
supply of rental property. The rental ﬁrm construct ignores these tax implications. In this
section, we examine data that pertains to the decision to supply rental property.
In 1996, the Census Bureau conducted a survey, the Property Owners and Managers
Survey (POMS), with the purpose of increasing understanding of the rental housing market.
The POMS sample includes 16,300 units which are rented or vacant for rent. Ninety percent
4of these properties are located inside metropolitan areas. Among all units, seventy-nine
percent are residential. A rental unit is deﬁned as a property rented for cash, and either
occupied by someone other than the owner or vacant and available for rent. Two types
of rental properties are included. The ﬁrst type is the single-unit rental property which
includes single-family detached or attached houses, condominium units, cooperative units,
or mobile homes. The second type is multi-unit rental property which includes units in
an apartment complex. We use this survey to assemble facts for model development and
evaluation purposes.
We want to investigate whether households or ﬁrms are the main holders of rental prop-
erty. This determines whether the landlord decision should be modeled from the point of
view of a dynamic ﬁrm, or as part of the household problem. If a household is deﬁned as
noninstitutional investors, trustees for an estate, or a limited partnership, Table 1 indicates
that households own over 90 percent of rental units.3 While this data shows that households
play an important role in the provision of rental housing services, we can not rule out the
possibility that a few institutional ﬁrms account for a large percent of units rented. Such a
ﬁnding would suggest the rental ﬁrm paradigm might be appropriate. In order to investigate
this possibility, we examine ownership by the number of units owned. As can be seen, the
noninstitutional investor still dominates rental ownership.
Table 1: Ownership and Rental Property
Total Less than 5 to 49 50 or more
Type of Owner Units 5 Units Units Units
Individual Investor, husband/wife 86.3 89.9 74.4 30.6
Trustee for Estate 2.0 1.9 2.6 1.0
Limited Partnership 2.8 1.7 5.5 25.4
General Partnership 2.9 2.2 5.2 12.9
Real Estate Investment Trust 0.7 0.6 1.2 2.6
Real Estate Corporation 1.6 1.0 3.7 10.9
Other Corporation 1.3 0.9 3.0 5.7
Non-proﬁt or Church 0.7 0.3 2.0 6.1
Source: Property Owners and Managers Survey (POMS)
We examined data on the acquisition of rental property. POMS reports that 85.3 percent
of the rental units were explicitly purchased while only 6.6 percent were inherited (or gifted).
This indicates that bequests do not play an important role in the decision to become a
landlord. Table 2 details how the purchase of rental property is ﬁnanced. As can be seen,
the vast majority (75 percent) of rental property is ﬁnanced through a mortgage type loan.
This suggests that in modelling the landlord decision the ﬁnancing aspect of the decision is
similar to the ﬁnancing decision for an owner occupied unit. POMS also indicates that a
downpayment is part of the landlord’s ﬁnancing package.
3POMS deﬁnes a noninstitutional owner to be individual investor (husband and wife), trustee for estate,
limited partnership, and general partnership.
5Table 2: Financing of Acquired Rental Property
Financing Method Frequency Percent
Mortgage Financed 4,046 75.5
Collateralized Borrowing 186 3.5
Cash 784 14.6
Some other manner 343 6.4
Total 5,359 100
Source: Property Owners and Managers Survey
The sources of the downpayment are bank cash deposits (61.6 percent), collateralized non
property borrowing (8.3 percent), sale of other real estate (7.8 percent), and the sale of stocks
and other savings vehicles (9.8 percent). Only 10 percent of the real estate acquisitions are
not ﬁnanced with a downpayment. These facts suggest that the landlord and owner occupied
decisions should be modeled in a similar manner.
We are also interested in the characteristics of individual landlords along several dimen-
sions. We would like to know how the provision of rental services varies with age and income
(or wealth) of the household. In Table 3 we report the ownership of rental property - either
single or multiple properties - by age. We observe
Table 3: Structure of Ownership of Rental Property by Age
Age Cohort Percent who Own
25 and under 0.2
26 to 35 5.1
36 to 45 16.9
46 to 55 25.5
56 to 65 25.8
66 to 75 17.5
76 and older 9.0
Source: Property Owners and Managers Survey
that the average number of units exhibits a hump over the life-cycle with the peak occurring
in the 56-65 age cohort. For our purposes, the major ﬁnding is that all age cohorts up to
age 65 are represented in the rental market.
Table 4: Structure of Ownership of Rental Property by Income
Income Range Percent who Own
Under $10,000 6.0
$10,000 to $30,000 19.5
$30,000 to $50,000 20.5
$50,000 to $75,000 16.1
$75,000 to $100,000 8.9
Over $100,000 29.0
Source: Property Owners and Managers Survey
Table 4 focuses on the ownership of rental property by income. As would be expected,
households with income over $100,000 account for the largest ownership percentage. A more
6interesting ﬁnding is that close to forty percent of rental properties are owned by individual’s
who earn between $10,000 and $50,000 in income. This indicates that a model should ﬁnd
the provision of rental services at all income levels.
In sum, some of the important facts pertaining to the rental market are:
• Households or non-institutional proprietors own most of the rental property.
• The size distribution of landlords is skewed with more than ﬁfty percent of the landlords
owning less than ﬁve units.
• Most of rental properties are acquired and ﬁnanced through a mortgage type loan.
• The probability of being a landlord increases with age and income.
These ﬁndings suggests that a theory that ignores the presence of the rental market as
part of the housing investment decision could miss an important channel through which tax
policy impacts decisions.
2 The Model
The economy is a general equilibrium overlapping generations growth model comprised of
households, ﬁrms, a ﬁnancial intermediary and government. Households derive utility from
the consumption of goods and housing services. They face uninsurable mortality and labor
income risks due to the lack of annuity markets and the absence of state contingent bonds.
Households can partially insure by investing in a risk free ﬁnancial asset and/or housing. The
ﬁnancial asset is denoted by a and oﬀers a riskless return. Short-selling is precluded indicating
that asset markets are incomplete. Investment in housing, h, diﬀers from the ﬁnancial asset
along several key dimensions. Housing generates services which are marketable. In addition,
housing is risky due to an idiosyncratic capital gain shock that is realized upon the sale
of the property. Investment in housing is indivisible and requires ﬁnancing through a long
term mortgage. Mortgage contracts are available from a ﬁnancial institution who receives
deposits from the household. The ﬁnancial ﬁrm also makes loans to ﬁrms in the form of
capital investment. Firms use capital and labor to produce a good that can be used for
consumption, capital or housing purposes. The government provides social security beneﬁts
to the retired by taxing the income of working households.
2.1 The Financial Intermediary and Mortgage Contracts
The ﬁnancial intermediary is a zero proﬁt ﬁrm. This ﬁrm receives deposits from households,
a0 and uses these funds to make loans to ﬁrms and households. Firms take out loans of
capital to produce goods and households use long-term mortgages to ﬁnance the housing
investment. Financial intermediaries receive mortgage payments, principal payments from
those individuals who sell their home with an outstanding mortgage position, as well as the
outstanding principal of individuals who unexpectedly die.
Since housing investment is large and indivisible, we assume that households are required
to used long-term loans. The ﬁnancial institution oﬀers a uniform mortgage product to all
households that desires to invest in housing. The mortgage contract is a function that spec-
iﬁes the length of the contract, the downpayment requirement, and the repayment schedule.
7More precisely, the decision to purchase a house of value ph0 requires a downpayment equal
to χ ∈ [0,1] percent of the value of the house. Hence, the total amount of borrowing is
equal to DN =( 1− χ)ph0 where the subscript N denotes the length of the mortgage. We
will denote z to be a vector of variables that pertain to the mortgage contract and include
the downpayment fraction, χ, the length of the mortgage contract, N, the period remaining
on the mortgage contract, n, and the mortgage interest rate, rm.The repayment schedule
is given by a mortgage payment function that depends on the vector z as well as the price
of housing and the size of the housing investment relevant to the contract. We deﬁne the
mortgage payment function as m(z,p,h0), and this payment is comprised of an interest pay-
ment, I(z,p,h0), and a principal (amortization) payment, A(z,p,h0). The remaining debt
and equity positions are represented by D(z,p,h0) and H(z,p,h0), respectively.4 If a house-
hold chooses to change their investment position, h0 6= h, their existing housing investment
must be sold and a new housing position purchased.5
2.2 Households
Households are indexed by their asset holding, a, investment position in housing, h, remaining
periods on the mortgage, n, the idiosyncratic income shock,  ,a n da g e ,j. We will summarize
the household state by Λ =( a,h,n, ,j). Households live a maximum of J periods, and
survival each period is subject to mortality risk. The probability of surviving from age j to
age j +1is denoted by ψj+1 ∈ (0,1), with ψ1 =1 .







4According to American Housing Survey (AHS) and POMS, 91 percent of homeowners and 87 percent of
landlords use ﬁxed rate mortgages (FRM). This mortgage contract is comprised of an increasing amortization






[1 − (1 + rm)−N]
DN.
The contract front loads the interest rate payments and back loads the principle payments where
At = m(z,p,h0) − rmDt.
The laws of motion for debt and home equity are
Dt−1 =( 1+rm)Dt − m(z,p,h0), ∀t,
and
Ht−1 = Ht +[ m(z,p,h0) − rmDt], ∀t,
where HN = χph0 denotes the home equity in the initial period.
5This assumption diﬀers from the standard durable good model where individuals can expand the set of
durables every period until they attain their desired level. In our model, households can purchase homes of
diﬀerent sizes, but they are forced to sell if they desire to buy a diﬀerent unit. Since housing investment
requires the use of a long-term mortgage contract, it becomes computationally infeasible to have households
holding a housing portfolio with diﬀerent mortgage balances.
8where 0 <β<1 is the discount factor, cj, is the consumption of goods at age j, dj,is the
amount of housing service consumption. The utility function is neoclassical and satisﬁes the
standard properties of continuity and diﬀerentiability.
Housing investment is lumpy and indivisible, and the price of a unit of housing is p.T h e
size of housing investment is restricted by the set H where H ≡ {0}∪{h,...,h} , h <. . .<h,
h is the minimum housing investment , and h is the upper bound on housing investment.
Housing investment, h>0, generates a ﬂow of housing services, s, that can be consumed.
We assume a linear technology, s = g(h0)=h0, that transforms the housing investment in the
current period into housing services. A household can choose a dwelling size that is equal
or less than the housing investment position The separation between housing investment
and housing consumption allows us to formalize rental markets. Those households that have
a positive housing investment can choose to consume all housing services s = h0 = d, or
pay a ﬁxed cost  >0 and sell (lease) some services in the market equal to h0 − d at the
rental price R. Homeowners that consume housing services equal to their housing investment
position forgo rental income which captures the opportunity cost of owner-occupied housing
explicitly in the budget constraint.





R(h0 − d) −   − x(h0,d) if d<h 0 and h0 > 0
−x(h0,d) if d = h0 and h0 > 0
0 if h0 =0
where the term x(h0,d) represents the housing maintenance expense. The rate that housing
depreciates depends on whether housing is owner-occupied or rental-occupied. A home-
owner that chooses a dwelling that this equal to their housing investment position incurs a
maintenance expense equal to x(h0,d)=δoph0 where δo represents the depreciation rate of
owner-occupied housing. If a household chooses to pay the ﬁxed cost to become a landlord,
the maintenance expense depends on the fraction of services the household consumes and the
fraction other households consume. Rental-occupied housing depreciates at δr >δ o. The dif-
ferent depreciation rates are a result of a moral hazard problem that occurs in rental markets
as renters decide how intensively to utilize the dwelling. That is, x(h0,d)=δopd+δrp(h0−d).
For renters (h0 =0 ) , the implied rental income is zero.
Households earn income in the labor market if they are under the age j∗, or from re-
tirement beneﬁts if they are of age j∗ or older. Each household receives a time endowment
that is inelastically supplied to the labor market until retirement. Households diﬀer in their
productivity for two reasons - age and period speciﬁc productivity shocks. We deﬁne υj
as the labor productivity of an age j individual. The age proﬁle of labor productivity is
{νj}
j∗
j=1 . Households also draw a period speciﬁc earnings component,  , from a probability
space, where   ∈ E. The realization of the current period productivity component evolves
according to the transition law Π , 0. Thus, a worker’s labor earnings in a given period is
w υj where w is the market wage rate. In addition to labor earnings, the gross return from
the asset market investment is another source of income, and r is the net interest rate. We
deﬁne the household’s (non rental) income as:
y =
½
w υj +( 1+r)a + yr + tr if j<j ∗,
θ +( 1+r)a + yr + tr if j ≥ j∗. (2)
where θ is retirement beneﬁt, and tr represents a lump-sum transfer from accidental bequests.
9Sources of income are taxable. Labor income is subject to a payroll tax that is used
to fund retirement beneﬁts. Labor, (net) asset and rental income are subject to an income
tax. The tax function could be nonlinear and allow for deductions from taxable income. We
deﬁne e y to be taxable income after deductions. Let Ω represent the set of deductions in the




w υj + ra+ R(h0 − d) − Ω if j<j ∗,
θ + ra+ R(h0 − d) − Ω if j ≥ j∗.
We deﬁne the total tax obligation of a household by T(e y).
The household’s budget constraint depends on the state of the household, Λ, and we can
isolate ﬁve possible budget constraints which depend on the housing state position, h,a n d
the current housing position, h0. A household that rented housing services in the previous
period, h =0 , and continues to rent housing services, h0 > 0, has a budget constraint
c + a
0 + Rd = y − T(e y).
The second case focuses on the household who rented in the prior period, h =0 , but
decides to invest in housing, h0 > 0. The purchase of a home requires a downpayment, χ, a
transaction cost, φb, and a mortgage with a mortgage payment of m(z,p,h0). The purchase
of housing investment oﬀers the household the option to earn rental income. The budget
c o n s t r a i n tf o rt h i sc a s ei s :
c + a
0 +( φb + χ)ph
0 + m(z,p,h
0)=y − T(e y).
A third possible situation is the household who enters a period with a positive housing
investment position, h>0, and decides to sell oﬀ their entire investment position and rent
housing services, h0 =0 . The decision to sell property results in the household being subject
to an idiosyncratic capital gain shock, ξ ∈ Ξ that determines the ﬁnal sales value that the
homeowner receives when changing the size of the housing investment. This i.i.d. shock is
not reveal until the house is sold. The unconditional probability of the shock is πξ. The sale
of the house generates income, pξh, net of selling costs, φs, and remaining principle D(z,p,h)
which depends on whether the mortgage has been paid oﬀ or not.6.
c + a
0 + Rd = y − T(e y)+( 1− φs)pξh − D(z,p,h),
where φs is the transaction cost associated with selling a property. The decisions with respect
to consumption, savings, and the dwelling size depends on the realization of the idiosyncratic
capital gain shock, ξ.
The last two cases deal with a household that enters the period with a housing investment
position, h>0, and decides to continue to have a housing position, h0 > 0. A key issue is
whether the household decides to change their housing position. If the household decides to
maintain their housing position, h = h0, the budget constraint is:
c + a
0 + m(z,p,h)=y − T(e y)
In this situation, the household must make a mortgage payment if n>0.
6As our analysis will be conducted at the steady state, other than the diﬀerences between buying and
selling transaction costs, there are no diﬀerences in the purchase and selling prices of housing.
10If the household decides to either up-size or down-size their housing investment position,
(i.e., h 6= h,h > 0,h 0 > 0), the budget constraint becomes:
c + a
0 +( φb + χ)ph
0 + m(z
0,p,h
0)=y − T(e y)+( 1− φs)pξh − D(z,p,h)
The current period choices are impacted by the idiosyncratic capital gains shock.
We can combine the various budget constraints into one general budget constraint if we
deﬁne several indicator variables. Let Io be an indicator function that is equal to one if
the household has a positive housing investment position and zero otherwise. Let Ic be an
indicator function that is equal to one if h does not equal h0 and zero otherwise. Given these
deﬁnitions, the general budget constraint is:
c + a
0 + IoIc[(φb + χ)ph
0 + m(z
0,p,h
0)] + (1 − Ic)Iom(z,p,h)+( 1− Io)Rd =
y − T(e y)+Ic[(1 − φs)pξh − D(z,p,h)]. (3)
2.3 Firms
In this economy, a representative ﬁrm produces a good in a competitive environment that
can be used either for consumption, government, capital purposes, or housing purposes. The
representative ﬁrm produces goods using a constant returns to scale technology F(K,L)
where K and L denote the amount of capital and labor utilized. The aggregate resource
constraint is given by
C + K
0 + IH + G + Υ = F(K,L)+( 1− δK)K (4)
where C, K, G, IH and Υ represent aggregate consumption, the aggregate capital stock at the
beginning of the next period, aggregate government spending, aggregate housing investment
and various transactions costs, respectively.7 The parameter δK denotes the depreciation
rate for physical capital.
2.4 Government
In this economy, the government engages in a number of activities: ﬁnances some exogenous
government expenditure; provides retirement beneﬁts through a social security program;
and redistributes the wealth of those individuals who die unexpectedly. We assume that the
ﬁnancing of government expenditure and social security are run under diﬀerent budgets.
The government provides social security beneﬁts to retired households. The beneﬁt, θ,
is based on a fraction, θ, of the average income of workers. These payments are ﬁnanced
by taxing the wage income if employed households at the tax rate τp. Since this policy is
self-ﬁnancing, the tax rate depends on the replacement ratio θ. The social security beneﬁt




















7The deﬁnition of aggregate housing investment and total transactions cost are deﬁne in the appendix.
11In the general budget constraint, revenues are collected from income taxation. Since
income taxes are not linear we deﬁne t(Λ) to be the tax obligations of each households based




and the term Φ(Λ) represents the measure of households.
The government also has the responsibility to collect the physical and housing assets of
those individual who unexpectedly die. Both of these assets are sold and any outstanding
debt on housing is paid oﬀ. The remaining value of these assets is distributed to the surviving




where Tris the aggregate (net) value of assets accumulated over the state space from unex-








μj(1 − ψj)[(1 − φs)pξh(Λ) − D(Λ)]Φ(dΛ). (7)
2.5 Market Equilibrium
This economy has four markets: the asset market, labor market, the rental of housing services
market, and the goods market. All these markets are assumed to be competitive. The goods
market clearing condition is deﬁn e db ye q u a t i o n( 4 ) .I nt h el a b o rm a r k e t ,l a b o rd e m a n di s
determined by the marginal product of labor, F2(K,L).Labor is inelastically supplied and
determined by L =
Pj∗−1
j=1 μjvj .
The asset market clearing condition in this model is complicated by the presence of
mortgages, unexpected death and idiosyncratic capital gain shocks. In an attempt to clarify,
we introduce some additional notation that distinguishes whether a decision is impacted
by an idiosyncratic capital gain shock. Let Is(Λ) be an indicator value that is equal to one
when the housing investment position is sold and zero otherwise. The total amount of capital











































8In the formulation, the new born generation does not receive a lump sum transfer as we endow these
individuals with capital assets as observed in data. In this model the aggregate mass of households of age 1
is μ1 and total population is normlized to one.
12where Φ(dΛ) ≡ Φ(da × dh × dn × d  × dj).
The ﬁr s tl i n eo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo ft h ee q u a t i o nc a p t u r e st h es a v i n g sd e p o s i t e d
by households to the ﬁnancial intermediary. The ﬁrst of these terms measures household
deposits if the housing position is not sold while the second term on this line allows deposit
decisions to be impacted by the idiosyncratic capital gain shock when the housing position
is sold. From the total of household deposits, new mortgage loans must be subtracted. The
second line on the right hand side measures new mortgages, and allows for diﬀerences created
by idiosyncratic capital gains shocks. In the third line, mortgage payments received by the
ﬁnancial intermediary are measured. This includes payments received by ﬁrst-time buyers
and existing homeowners who continue to make payments on their mortgage, as well as those
homeowners who sell property and have a new mortgage payment which is aﬀected by the
idiosyncratic capital gain shock. The last line on the right hand side of the equation captures
the outstanding mortgage principle from those households who sell their house as well as the
payment of outstanding debt of households who unexpectedly die with outstanding principle.
The last market determines the price of rental-occupied housing. This condition is de-
termined by the aggregate amount of housings services made available by landlords and the




















This deﬁnition accounts for the eﬀect of the idiosyncratic capital gains shock for both the
landlord and the renter that just sold a property.
Af o r m a ld e ﬁnition of the recursive equilibrium is provided in the appendix.
3 Parameterization and Baseline Results
In order to evaluate the model, parameters must be speciﬁe d .W ec h o o s et oe s t i m a t em o s to f
the parameters using an exactly-identiﬁed Method of Moments approach. That is, we solve
for the parameters that are consistent with some key properties of U. S. economy observed
in 1994-96. This choice is motivated by the fact that Property Owners and Manager Survey
is only available for this time period. Disaggregate housing data is available biannually from
the American Housing Survey and use the 1995 survey.
3.1 Description of Functional Forms and Parameters
Functional Forms: Our choice of the utility function departs from the usual speciﬁcation
of a constant relative risk aversion utility function with a homothetic aggregator between
consumption of goods and housing services. This preference structure is not consistent an
increasing ratio of housing services/ consumption ratio by age which is observed in the
data, [see Jeske (2005) for a detailed discussion].9 We assume that preferences over the
9We also ﬁnd that such a momentary utility function generates insuﬃcient movements in housing position
as well as introducing some counterfactional implications for the rental market.








where σ1, and σ2 determine the curvature of the utility function with respect to consumption
and housing services, respectively. The relative ratio of σ1 and σ2 determines the growth
rate of the housing to consumption. A larger curvature on consumption implies that the
marginal utility of consumption declines faster than the marginal utility of housing services.
Consequently, when household income increases over the life-cycle, households choose to
allocate a larger fraction of resources to housing services. We choose to set σ1 =3and
σ2 =1and estimate and the preference parameter γ.
The representative ﬁrm uses a Cobb-Douglas technology to produce a good that can be
used either for consumption, housing investment, or capital good investment. We assume
that the aggregate production function is of the Cobb-Douglas form, F(K,L)=KαL1−α.
The capital share parameter is set to 0.29. This value is calculated by dividing private ﬁxed
assets plus the stock of consumer durables less the stock of residential structures by output
plus the service ﬂows from consumer durables less the service ﬂow from housing.10
Population structure: Each period in the model is taken to be three years. An individual
enters the labor force at age 20 (model period 1) and lives till age 83 (model period 23).
Retirement is assumed to be mandatory at age 65 (model period 16). Individuals survive to
the next period with probability ψj+1.These probabilities are set at survival rates from the
National Center for Health Statistics, United States Life Tables (1994). The size of the age
speciﬁc cohorts, μj, needs to be speciﬁed. Because of our focus on steady state equilibrium,
these shares must be consistent with the stationary population distribution. As a result,
these shares are determined from μj = ψjμj−1/(1 + ρ) for j =2 ,3,...,j and
PJ
j=1 μj =1 ,
where ρ denotes the rate of growth of population. Using resident population as the measure
of the population, we set this the three year growth rate to 3.643 percent.
Endownments: Workers are assumed to have an inelastic labor supply, but the eﬀective
quality of their supplied labor depends on two components. One component is an age-
speciﬁc, υj, an is designed to capture the "hump" in life cycle earnings. We use data from
U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Money, Income of Households, Families, and Persons in the
Unites Stated, 1994," Current Population Reports, Series P-60 to construct this variable. The
other component captures the stochastic component of earnings and is based on Storesletten,
Telmer and Yaron (2004). We discretize this income process into a ﬁve state Markov chain
using the methodology presented in Tauchen (1986). The values we report reﬂect the three
year horizon employed in the model. As a result, the eﬃciency values associated with each
possible productivity value   are
  ∈ E = {4.41,3.51,2.88,2.37,1.89}
and the transition matrix is:
π =
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
0.47 0.33 0.14 0.05 0.01
0.29 0.33 0.23 0.11 0.03
0.12 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.12
0.03 0.11 0.23 0.33 0.29
0.01 0.05 0.14 0.33 0.47
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
.
10A data appendix is available the details the calculation of this parameter as well as other parameters
used in the paper.
14Each household is born with an initial asset position. The purpose of this assumption
is to account for the fact that some of the youngest households who purchase housing have
some wealth. Failure to allow for this initial asset distribution creates a bias against the
purchase of homes in the earliest age cohorts. As a result we use the asset distribution
observed in Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) to match the initial distribution of
wealth for the cohort of age 20 to 23. Each income state has assigned the corresponding
level of assets to match the nonhousing wealth to earnings ratio.
Housing: The housing market introduces a number of parameters. The purchase of a
house requires a mortgage and downpayment. In this paper we focus on 30 year ﬁxed rate
mortgage. As a result of the assumption that a period is three years, we set the mortgage
length, N, to ten periods. The downpayment requirement, χ, is set to twenty percent.11
Buying and selling property is subject a transaction costs. We assume that all these costs
a r ei n c u r r e da tp u r c h a s ea n ds e tφs =0and φb =0 .06. Because of the lumpy nature of
housing, the speciﬁcation of the second point in the housing grid determines the minimum
house size, h. The speciﬁcation of this grid point has implications for the timing of the
homeownership decision and thus wealth portfolio decisions. To avoid having the choice of
this variable having inadvertent implications for the results, we determine the size of this
grid point as part of the estimation problem. As previously explained, housing depreciates
at rates which depend on whether the property is owner occupied or rented. The values for
δo and δr are estimated. The parameter   aﬀects the number of households that choose to
become landlords. Determination of the this parameters is diﬃcult as we have little direct
evidence on the number of households who own rental property. An indirect measure is
to calculate the number of homeowners that report rental income. In the AHS in 1995,
approximately ten percent of the sampled homeowners claim to receive rental income. As a
result, we choose to set   to 0.05.
We used data from the 1995 American Housing Survey to quantify the i.i.d. capital
gain shock. To calculate the probability distribution for this shock we measure capital
g a i n sb a s e do nt h ep u r c h a s ep r i c eo ft h ep r o p e r t ya n dw h a tt h ep r o p e r t yo w n e rb e l i e v e st o
be the current market value. This ratio is adjusted for the holding length to express the
appreciation in annualized terms. Then, we estimate a kernel density and then discretize the
density in three even partitions. The average annualized prices changes ranging from lowest
to highest are -6.6, -1.4, and 10.5 percent. These values are adjusted to be consistent with
a period being deﬁned as three years. In order to test the robustness of the data from the
American Housing Survey, we employed a similar approach using 1995 Tax Roll Data for
Duval County in Florida. Jacksonville is the major city in Duval County. This data follows
real estate properties as opposed to individuals. As a result, we can calculate annualized
capital gains based in actual sales. We ﬁnd very similar estimates for the idiosyncratic capital
gains shock using this data source.
Government and the Income Tax Function: The government enters the model in a
number of ways. Income is provided to retired individuals through a social security program.
We assume the retirement program is self-ﬁnanced through a payroll tax on the earnings of
workers. After retirement, households receive a transfer based on some fraction of the average
labor income. The replacement ratio is set at thirty percent which results in a payroll tax
on the worker of 5.25 percent. Government spending is ﬁnanced through a tax on income.
In order to get a more accurate assessment of housing policy wedges, we want the income
11The American Housing Survey in 1993-95 presents data that shows that the average downpayment is
approximately twenty percent.
15t a xc o d et ob eag o o da p p r o x i m a t i o no ft h ea c t u a lt a xc o d ef o rt h eU S .G o u v e i aa n dS t r a u s s
(1994) estimated a functional form for the US federal income tax code that is theoretically
motivated by the equal sacriﬁce principle. The actual taxes paid by a household, T(e y),a r e
based on adjusted gross income, and is determined by the functional form




where (η0,η 1,η 2) are policy parameters. The marginal income tax rate is
T





This functional form is very ﬂexible and allows lump-sum taxes (η1 = −1),p r o p o r t i o n a l
(η1 → 0), or progressive taxes (η1 > 0) as special cases. The parameter η0 is a scaling factor
that determines the level of the tax brackets and the marginal tax rate but does not impact
the curvature of the tax function. The parameter η2 depends on units of measurement used to
measure income and determines the size of income deduction. Gouveia and Strauss estimate
the policy parameters and ﬁnd that η0 =0 .258,η 1 =0 .768, and η2 =0 .003710. In the
benchmark economy we use the same parameter estimates used by Gouveia and Strauss for
η1 but η2 is set to 0.3710 to accommodate the model measurement units. The parameter η0
is endogenously determined when solving the model to target the ratio of federal government
expenditure-GDP observed in 1994.12 In all policy simulations, this parameter is adjusted to
g e n e r a t et h es a m ea m o u n to ft a xr e v e n u ea st h eb a s e l i n ee c o n o m y .T h ea d j u s t i n gt h eo t h e r
parameter would change the progressivity of the tax code or the size of deductions across
experiments making comparisons more diﬃcult. Following the provisions of the income tax
code in the U.S. we allow mortgage interest payments and maintence expenses for rental
property. However, the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing does not generate a
tax obligation although rental income is taxed.
The entire set of parameters that we set are presented in Table 5 in annualized terms.
12The Gouveia and Strauss tax function was estimated for the period 1979-1989. As our model is calibrated
for the period 1994-1996, we acknowledge some inconsistency. However, since our focus is on the importance
of various margins impacted by housing policy, we do not feel this inconsistency is a major problem.




















3.2 Estimation and Performance of the Baseline Model
We estimate seven parameters using an exactly-identiﬁed Method of Moments approach.
The estimation of the structural parameters in not separated from the computation of equi-
librium. This means three additional nonlinear equations (asset market, government budget
constraint, and accidental bequest) have to satisﬁed along with the moments observed in
the data. The parameters that need to be estimated are the depreciation rate of the capital
stock, δ, the depreciation rate for rental units, δr, the depreciation rate for ownership units,
δo, the relative importance of consumption goods to housing services, γ, and the individual
discount rate, β, the minimum size of the smallest housing investment position, h, and the
tax function parameter η0. We identify these parameter values so that the resulting aggregate
statistics in the model economy are equal to seven targets observed in the U.S. economy.
1. The ratio of capital to gross domestic product: 2.541. This is the average for the period
1958-2001 where we deﬁne the capital stock as private ﬁxed assets plus the stock of
consumer durables less the stock of residential structures so as to be consistent with
capital in the model. Output is GDP plus service ﬂows from consumer durables less
the service ﬂow from housing.13
2. The ratio of the housing capital stock to the nonhousing capital stock: 0.43. The hous-
ing capital stock is deﬁned as the value of ﬁxed assets in owner and tenant residential
property.
3. The ratio of investment in capital goods to output: 0.135.
4. The ratio of the investment in residential structures to housing capital stock: 0.121.
13We estimated services ﬂows using procedures outlines in Cooley and Prescott (1995).
175. Housing consumption relative to nonhousing consumption: 0.23. This is the average
between 1990 and 2000 but the number does not vary greatly over the period. Housing
services are deﬁned as personal consumption expenditure for housing and non housing
consumption is deﬁned as nondurable and services consumption expenditures net of
housing expenditures.
6. Federal government expenditure relative to output: 0.074.
7. The homeownership rate in the period 1994 is 0.64 percent.
The estimated parameters expressed in annual terms are presented in Table 6. The model
performs quite well in matching the seven targeted moments. The implied targets generated
by the model solution are within one percent error for all the observed targets.
Table 6: Estimation of Model (Annualized Values)
Statistic Target Model %Error
Ratio of wealth to gross domestic product (K/Y ) 2.541 2.5446 0.143
Ratio of housing stock to ﬁxed capital stock (H/K) 0.430 0.4266 -0.792
Housing investment to housing stock ratio (xH/H) 0.040 0.0403 -0.388
Ratio housing services to consumption of goods (Rd/c) 0.230 0.2291 -0.411
Ratio ﬁxed capital investment to output (δK/Y) 0.135 0.1353 0.339
Homeownership rate 0.640 0.6370 -0.468
Government expenditure to output (T(e y)/Y) 0.074 0.0742 -0.005
Variable Parameter Estimate
Individual discount rate β 0.9749
Share of consumption goods in the utility function γ 0.9541
Tax function coeﬃcient η0 0.1974
Depreciation rate of owner occupied housing δo 0.0340
Depreciation rate of rental housing δr 0.0749
Depreciation rate of capital stock δk 0.0428
Minimum house size h 1.4726
Since the model has been estimated to replicate the aggregate moments we explore
whether reasonable housing statistics are generated. The model could be evaluated along a
number of dimensions. We focus on the distribution of ownership rates by age; the distri-
bution of housing consumption measured in square feet by age and household income; and
the implications for the rental market. In Table 7 we summarize how the homeownership
rate, the distribution of landlords, and housing consumption vary by age. We also report
how housing size varies by income.
18Table 7: Summary of Aggregate Results
Variable Homeownership Rate
by Age Cohorts 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
AHS Data 33.2 67.7 78.4 80.3 73.5
Benchmark 33.1 73.5 86.4 91.3 66.5
Variable Distribution of Landlords
by Age Cohorts 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
POMS Data 4.2 27.4 42.8 19.6 6.0
Benchmark 21.7 33.7 24.1 13.8 6.6
Variable Sqft. Owners1
by Age Cohorts 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
AHS Data 1,854 2,220 2,301 2,088 2,045
Benchmark 2,147 2,297 2,429 2,514 2,362
b y I n c o m e Q u i n t i l e s Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 5
AHS Data 1,867 2,211 2,699 3,037 3,091
Benchmark 2,254 2,192 2,773 3,887 4,242
1
Owner occupied house size is measured in terms of square feet.
Data is from the American Housing Survey and Property Owners and Manager Survey.
The model captures the hump-shaped behavior of ownership as the fraction of homeowners
increases by age until retirement. Downsizing in the older cohorts is observed, but partic-
ipation are overstated for the middle age cohorts. This can be due to the fact that in a
model with only idiosyncratic labor income shock, most households eventually end up be-
coming homeowners. Since a focal point of housing policy is the participation of the younger
households, we report the homeownership rate for households age 35 and under. The data
indicates an ownership rate of 33.2 percent for all households under 35 while the model gen-
erates a corresponding homeownership rate of 33.1 percent. When studying the impact of
the current tax treatment of homeowners and landlords we pay particular attention to this
age group.
We are also interested in determining whether the model generates reasonable partic-
ipation behavior in the supply of rental housing services. In Table 7 we report how the
participation of household who are also landlord varies by age. The data for this distrib-
ution is based on data from the 1995 Property Owners and Managers Survey. We observe
that the distribution of landlords exhibits a hump which occurs between age 50 and 64. The
model generates a humped shaped participation pattern. However, the peak in the hump
occurs somewhat earlier than in the model.
A frequent question is why have house sizes increased in the United States. One response
is the current tax code which provides incentives to consume large units of owner-occupied
housing. If this issue is to be addressed, it is important to inquire whether the model
generates distributions of the consumption of housing services similar to what is actually
observed. Some papers measure housing consumption using expenditure to measure housing
services. Others just report the ratio with respect to goods consumption (deﬁned in a
broad sense). We report housing consumption in terms of square feet - the measure most
19frequently used to measure house size. We ﬁnd that the model generates two important
features observed in the data. The house size implied in the model are consistent with house
sizes observed from either an age or income distribution perspective. The largest average
size house occurs in households between age 50 and age 64. The average house size for this
cohort is 2,301 square feet. The model generates an average house size for this cohort of
2 , 4 2 9s q u a r ef e e t . F o rt h ey o u n g e s ta g ec o h o r t ,t h ea v e r a g es i z eo fah o u s ei nt h ed a t ai s
1,854 square feet, whereas our model ﬁnds that the average size house for this cohort is
2,147 square feet. Hence, we do ﬁnd evidence that the model overpredicts housing size. If
housing size is examined by an income perspective, data shows that house size increases with
i n c o m e .T h ea v e r a g es i z eh o u s eo fah o m e o w n e ri nt h el o w e s ti n c o m eq u i n t a li s1 , 8 6 7s q u a r e
feet while the average size house at the highest income quintal is 3,091 square feet. The
model ﬁnds that home size tends to increase with income. However, the model once again
overpredicts house size. The relatively smaller house size observed in the data for the top
income quintiles may partially explained by the top coding, as well as the under sampling,
of high income households in the American Housing Survey.
The Supply of Rental Property
3.3 Individual key determinants
One of the contributions of this paper is the endogeneity of the supply of rental property. In
this section, we explore the key determinants of the decision to supply housing services to
the rental market. We must now be more precise with respect to the income tax deductions
that are allowed. The tax code treats the services generated by the housing investment
and the treatment of maintenance expenses asymmetrically over individuals and this has
ramiﬁcations for the decision to supply rental property. We introduce this distinction by
deﬁning κo to be the fraction of service income consumed by owner-occupied housing that is
taxable and and κr the fraction of services rental income that is taxable. In the current U.S.
tax code, these coeﬃcients have the value of κo =0and κr =1 . In addition, we allow for
diﬀerential treatment toward the deductibility of maintenance expenses. The terms ιo and
ιr represent the fraction of maintenance expense from owner and rental occupied housing,
respectively, that are deductible. In the current tax code in the U.S., ιo =0 , and ιr =1 . As
a result of these modiﬁcations, the deﬁnition of taxable income becomes
e y =
½
w υj + ra+ κrR(h0 − d)+κoRd − ιrδrp(h0 − d) − ιoδ0pd − Ω if j<j ∗,
θ + ra+ κrR(h0 − d)+κoRd − ιrδrp(h0 − d) − ιoδ0pd − Ω if j ≥ j∗.
where Ω represents other deductions.
The ﬁrst-order condition for a household that has a positive housing investment h0 > 0
and chooses to pay the ﬁxed entry cost ( >0) to become a landlord is
Ud
Uc






⎣ p(ιrδr − ιoδo | {z }
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where Uc and Ud represents the marginal utility with respect consumption c, and housing
services ﬂows d, respectively. The right hand side of this expression has several nonstandard
20components. The ﬁrst term labeled as the “Nontax Eﬀect” captures the net beneﬁto f
supplying an additional unit of rental property to the market. The rental price of a unit of
housing services, R, measures the beneﬁt to a household of forgoing a unit of housing services.
This beneﬁt is reduced the greater the spread in the depreciation rate for rental and owner-
occupied housing, ∆δ =( δr − δo). In the absence of tax considerations, the eﬀective cost of
owner-occupied housing services is Ro = R − p(δr −δo). The implicit moral hazard problem
makes renting more expensive than owning. In addition, the nonlinear income tax code
adds an additional eﬀect, which we label as the “Taxation Eﬀect.” This eﬀect arises from
the asymmetric tax treatment toward who consumes the housing services and the deduction
of owner-occupied and rental-occupied maintenance expenses. The beneﬁt from supplying
services to the rental market is reduced the larger the spread in the fraction of rental housing
service income relative to owner-occupied housing service income. The beneﬁt for supplying
housing services to the rental market is increased the larger the rental maintenance expense
deduction relative to the owner-occupied maintenance deduction.
Under the current tax code, the income from the consumption of rental-occupied housing
s e r v i c e si st a x a b l ew h i l et h ei n c o m eo fo w n e r - o ccupied serviced is not taxable. In contrast,
rental maintenance expenses are deductible, but owner-occupied maintenance expenses are




= R(1 − T
0(e y)) + p[T
0(e y)δr − 4δ].
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side indicates that the failure to tax owner-occupied housing
services reduces the eﬀective cost of this type of housing. This wedge introduces a bias
towards owner-occupied housing. When the imputed rental income from owner-occupied
housing is taxed at the same rate as rental housing, κo = κr, then the asymmetry in the
t a xc o d ei se l i m i n a t e d .T h es e c o n dt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d ef o c u s e so nt h ed e d u c t i b i l i t y
of maintenance expenses for rental occupied housing. This deduction introduces a bias
towards rental property, and increases the opportunity cost of owner-occupied housing as
the deduction for rental maintenance expenses is forgone when consuming additional owner-
occupied housing.
Any tax code impacts decisions via a level eﬀect and a marginal eﬀect. The tax provisions
impact adjusted gross income. This is a level eﬀect. The progressivity of the tax code
eﬀects the size of the impact of the various asymmetries. For example, under a more (less)
progressive tax code, the tax savings of some of these provisions are larger (smaller). The
standard assumption in the literature is to ignore the progressivity of the tax code, thus
implying the marginal tax rate is zero, T0(e y)=0 . The ﬁrst order condition is reduced to:
Us
Uc
= R − p4δ.
This expression is similar to an arbitrage condition that has to be satisﬁed for all the indi-
viduals that participate in the rental market supplying property. For the optimal level of
consumption and housing services, {c∗,d ∗}, the implied ratio of marginal utilities ϑ = Ud∗/Uc∗
determines the equilibrium rental rate R∗ = ϑ + p4δ. If household preferences are homo-
thetic, the ratio of consumption to housing services is constant across individuals. In the
absence of nonlinear taxation all the landlords have the same ratio. Under non-homothetic
14The U.S. tax code allows for accelerated depreciation of rental property suggesting that ιr ≥ 1.
21preferences, the ratio is not constant, and individuals with higher income are likely to con-
sume more housing since it is a luxury good. Consequently, the rental supply response will
vary depending on the income and age of the household.
The interaction of the endogenous rental supply decision in an environment where house-
holds face non-homothetic preferences, and a progressive tax code represent some of the
main diﬀerences of between our formulation and the literature. Gervais (2002) and Naka-
jima (2003) assume the rental market is determined by a ’stand-in’ rental ﬁrm. This ﬁrm
takes deposits from investors and makes mortgage loans to homeowners. The maximization
problem of this ﬁrm results in an arbitrage condition that ties the rental price, R,t ot h e
interest rate and the depreciation rate of rental property, r +δr. This condition implies that
in equilibrium, the return from rental investment should be equal to the return on capital.
Consequently, in this context the stock of rental-occupied housing is entirely determined
by the demand for rental property. Only housing policies that reduce the maintenance
cost via subsidies have an impact on the equilibrium rental rate. In contrast, Ríos-Rull
and Sánchez-Marcos (2005) consider an endowment economy with a ﬁxed supply of owner-
occupied housing. The role of this assumption is to magnify price eﬀects by eliminating
movements in aggregate quantities. In our model the rental rate is determined in rental
market and depends on the individual response of landlords. Hence, the rental price does
not need to be tied to the equilibrium interest rate.
3.4 Rental supply decomposition
The modelling of supply of rental services as part of the household decision problem has
implications for the supply response to a rental price change. If the supply of rental property
is very elastic, a small change in the price of rental housing will increase supply along two
dimensions. Households participating the rental housing market can choose to increase their
supply of housing services in the rental market. This response occurs at the intensive margin.
Some households that were not supplying rental property at the original price may ﬁnd it
beneﬁcial to become a landlord and supply rental property. This response occurs at the
extensive margin. Since we are interested in understanding the impact of changes in the
economic environment for the aggregate supply of rental property, we develop a framework
that allows us to quantify the intensive and extensive margin impacts.
The aggregate supply of rental property, S(Z), conditioned on a vector, Z, comprised
of parameters and relative prices, is simply the sum of individual household’s rental supply
decisions by type weighted by the measure of each type of household. A household’s rental
supply decision can be deﬁned as dr(Λ;Z) ≡ g(h0) − d(Λ;Z) where Λ =( a,h,n, ,j). The




We want to measure the rental housing service supply response if an element in z changes,
holding the remaining elements constant. The total rental supply response from a change in
the i − th element while all other elements remain unchanged, ∂S(Z)/∂Zi, can be decom-
posed into the response of households who supplied rental housing and continue to supply
rental services after the change in Zi, the response of households who previously did not
supply rental services and decide to supply rental services, and households who decide to
cease supplying rental services. In order to quantify this decomposition, we deﬁne the set
22of households who supply rental housing services by Ωr and the partition this set into indi-
viduals who continue supply rental services, Ωr
C, new household entrants Ωr
N, and household
departures Ωr
X.The aggregate supply response from a change in one element in zi is deﬁned

























The ﬁrst term measures the intensive margin of landlords who continue to supply rental
services after the change in Zi and is calculated by weighting the change in individual supply
by the pre-change measure. The second term captures the extensive margin response associ-
a t e dw i t ht h ec h a n g ei nm a s so fh o u s e h o l d st h a tc h o o s et ob e c o m el a n d l o r d si nap a r t i c u l a r
position in the state space Λ, while holding their rental supply response constant. Since
both the measure of households and the rental supply decisions can change, the third term -
a covariance factor - captures the simultaneous change in individual supply and the mass of
landlords in each position of Λ. The terms in the bracket capture net entry. That includes
the contribution of new landlords minus the participation of those landlords that choose to
exit the rental market.
Table 8: Rental Supply Decomposition
Rental Price Tax Parameter Spread Depreciations
4R =4 % 4R = −4% η1 =4 % η1 = −4% 4δ =4 % 4δ = −4%
Margin %∆ %∆ %∆ %∆ %∆ %∆
Intensive (Change Supply) 0.827 -0.024 0.061 -0.060 -0.401 0.343
Extensive (Change Mass) 0.044 -0.011 -0.045 2.099 -0.037 0.007
Covariance -0.091 0.020 -0.038 -1.375 0.057 0.043
Net Entry 5.469 -3.824 -0.004 -1.135 -1.713 1.719
Entry Eﬀect 5.628 -3.837 0.419 -0.829 -1.730 1.775
Exit Eﬀect -0.159 -0.013 -0.423 -0.305 0.017 -0.055
Total 6.250 -3.839 -0.026 -0.471 -2.094 2.113
Next, we use the model to measure the size of these eﬀects in response to an exogenous
change in the rental price, R, the progressivity of the tax code, η1, and the size of moral
hazard captured by the spread in depreciation rates 4δ. A four percent increase in the rental
price results in a positive supply response of 6.25 percent. Most of this change is due to new
household’s deciding to supply housing services to the rental market. This can be seen in the
size of the entry eﬀect. We also ﬁnd that the intensive margin accounts for thirteen percent
of the total supply response. If the rental price declines four percent we ﬁnd that supply
declines 3.84 percent. Almost the entire supply response to due to the negative entry eﬀect
in the household’s decision to supply rental property. This indicates the supply response to
a rental price change is not symmetric.
The spread in the depreciation rates on rental and owner-occupied housing is a measure
of moral hazard in the rental market. A four percent decline in the rental depreciation
23rate under the assumption that the rental price is held constant results in a 2.11 percent
increase in the supply of rental services as homeowners see an increase in the net return
to supplying housing services to this market. This supply response is dominated by new
entrants. Households supplying rental services prior to the change in spread increase their
position in the rental market and this accounts for approximately sixteen percent of the total
supply response. An increase in the depreciation rate spread decreases the supply and the
magnitude of the response is essentially the same.
In order to examine the role that taxes play, we change the parameter η1 which inﬂuences
the marginal tax rate. The result of changing this parameter is complex due to the interaction
of income and substitution eﬀects coupled asymmetries in the tax code. A four percent
decrease in the parameter η1 results results in a 0.47 percent decline in the supply of rental
services. The tax rate decline causes an increase in the supply of services on the extensive
margin. However, the decline in supply due to the intensive margin response and net exit
oﬀset the former eﬀect. In essence, the decline in the marginal rate seems be generating an
income eﬀect that slightly dominates the various substitution eﬀects. If this tax parameter
is increased by four percent, the overall supply response is essentially zero. This does not
mean that decisions are not aﬀected by a change in this parameter as we see a number of
household’s exiting the market. However, these household’s are replaced by new entrants
On the intensive margin, the supply response is positive. The combined extensive response
and the covariance eﬀect oﬀset the intensive margin eﬀect. In other words, the marginal tax
rate change has distributional implication depending on the household state.
4 Tax Treatment Analysis
In this section, we examine the eﬀects of the tax treatment on homeowners and landlords.
First, we explore how the eﬀects of the asymmetric tax treatments are modiﬁed when the
progressivity of the income tax code is changed. Second, we examine the implications of the
elimination of asymmetries in the tax treatment between owner and rental-occupied housing.
In both cases we analyze the compatibility of the experiments with the objective of housing
policy to foster owner-occupied housing.
4.1 Tax Progressivity Analysis
We begin by exploring the implications of changes in the progressivity of the income tax
code for housing tenure decisions, and the supply of rental property. At the household level,
a change in the degree of progressivity modiﬁes the incentives to purchase large homes as
high income and wealthy households can use the mortgage deduction to change the marginal
tax rate. As a result, a reduction in the marginal tax rate reduces the incentives to purchase
larger homes, and has implications for the supply of rental property.15 The change in pro-
gressivity also impacts revenue collection. We assume that the policy changes are revenue
neutral and allow the tax function parameter η0 to vary so that the government revenue
remains unchanged. This assumption is not innocuous as the income eﬀects associated with
ad i ﬀerent tax burden can potentially dominate the substitution eﬀect associated with the
tax rate change.
15The ﬁrst-order conditions for renters is Ud/Uc = R, so the progressivity of the income tax code does not
distort the consumption of housing services.
24We investigate the importance of the degree of progressivity in the tax code by considering
three diﬀerent cases. We consider a proportional income tax code where the marginal tax
rate is zero, T0(ay)=0 , a tax code that is more progressive than the Gouveia-Strauss
formulation embedded in the benchmark model, and a tax code with optimal progressivity
as suggested by Conesa and Krueger (2006).16 In Table 9 we present the aggregate results
from these alternative tax structures. All analysis is conducted under the assumption that
mortgage interest rate expenses are deductible and the housing services of owner-occupied
housing is not subject to taxation.
Table 9: Progressivity Income Tax and Housing
Interest Rate Rental Price Ownership
(% change) Aggregate Under 34 Income Q1
Benchmark 5.44% - 63.7 33.1 32.0
No Progressivity 5.04% -2.35 69.2 36.9 35.7
More Progressivity 5.82% 9.94 59.1 29.2 29.3
C-K Progressivity 5.14% 3.21 68.6 36.1 36.9
Gini After Tax Avg. Avg. Rental Mass Welfare
Income/Wealth Owner Size Supply Landlords λcd|λc
Benchmark 0.241/0.531 2,348 1,310 17.07 -
No Progressivity 0.253/0.527 2,444 1,311 18.74 4.1|4.5
More Progressivity 0.227/0.535 2,329 1,107 12.67 -3.4|-3.7
C-K Progressivity 0.251/0.529 2,496 1,132 14.16 3.2|3.5
The model indicates that changes in the marginal tax rate aﬀects relative prices (interest
rate and rental price) as well as altering the impact of the tax provisions that favor owner-
occupied housing. Under a proportional tax program, the marginal tax rate is reduced and
the equilibrium interest rate falls 40 basis points and the rental price falls 2.4 percent. With
Conesa-Krueger’s (C-K) optimally progressive tax structure, the interest rate falls 38 basis
points, but the rental price increases 3.2 percent. These responses clearly show that in an
environment where the supply of rental housing is elastic, rental price movements are not tied
to the equilibrium interest rate. The decline in the interest rate under both tax structures
is a result of the increase in individual savings. This increase is large enough to lower the
interest rate despite the increase in borrowing needed to support the increased participation
in the owner-occupied housing market. With the larger amount of funds being directed
to the productive sector, average income increases when progressivity is reduced. This
mechanism explains why the relationship between progressivity and ownership is negative
and quantitatively large. The complete elimination of progressivity results in the ownership
rate increasing from 63.7 to 69.2 percent. If progressivity is increased from that in the
benchmark economy, we ﬁnd the aggregate homeownership rate declines to 59.1 percent.
Changes in participation rates from either an age or income perspective mirror the aggre-
gate results. When progressivity in the tax code falls, the participation of youngest cohort
and lowest income quintile increases. If progressivity is increased beyond that in the bench-
mark economy, the homeownership rates fall. Much of the change in participation rates of
the youngest and poorest households is a consequence of the revenue neutrality assumption.
16Conesa and Krueger formulation abstracts from housing and rental markets. Consequently, their tax
code might not be optimal in our context. In addition, in their paper the labor supply is elastic whereas in
this paper households inelastically supply labor until retirement age.
25Figure 1: Progressivity Income Tax and Housing









































In Figure 1, the the implied marginal tax rates for the various tax structures are presented.
Because the marginal tax rate under a proportional tax code is zero, we graph the average
tax rate that is endogenously determined at a ten percent level by this tax code. As can be
seen, under a more progressivity tax code, the marginal tax rates for low income households
decreases and increases for middle and high income groups. Under the Conesa and Krueger’s
(2006) tax code, the coeﬃcients in the Gouveia and Strauss tax function are chosen so as
to maximize social welfare in their model economy. As can be seen, their tax coeﬃcients
imply that the optimal income tax structure should be less progressive than the tax structure
of the baseline model, but more progressive that a proportional tax system. We see that
compared to the proportional tax schedule, the marginal tax rates are higher for high income
households and somewhat lower for low income households.
Each of tax code structures have implications for the equilibrium wage and average in-
come. If the tax code is changes to be proprotional, average income increases 6.9 percent.
The C-K ‘optimally’ progressive tax code results is a 5.9 percent increase in average icome.
A more progressive tax structure leads to a 5.9 decrease in average income. Given the impli-
cations that the alternative tax has for average income, the implications for the distribution
of income or wealth is an obvious next question. We use the Gini coeﬃcient to measure
inequality. We ﬁnd that a change in the progressivity of the income tax has a small eﬀect in
the Gini coeﬃcient for income and even smaller for wealth. Castañeda et al. (2003) report
higher values for the Gini coeﬃcient of earnings and wealth. The diﬀerence is due to three
factors. First, our model is incapable of generating suﬃcient high wealth concentration at
the very top of the distribution since bequests are rule out. Second, wealthy households are
not allow to repay faster their mortgage obligations and that increases their liabilities with
the ﬁnancial intermediary. Finally, we measure after tax earnings and wealth.
Table 9 indicates that the degree of progressivity of the tax code has implications for
house size, the supply of housing services to the rental market and the mass of landlords.
The key to understanding these results is the interplay of average income and price eﬀects.
The income reduction under a more progressive tax system reduces both the ownership rate
and the average house size. From a distributional perspective, both the ownership rate
26and house size need not decline under a more progressive tax system as the tax beneﬁto fa
mortgage deduction increases at larger marginal tax rates. We will further develop this point
when we discuss the distributional implications of progressivity. Under a less progressive tax
system, the magnitude of the increase in housing consumption is similar to the magnitude
of the increase in net income which ranges between 5 to 6 percent. The speciﬁcation of
nonhomothetic preferences accounts for this relationship since as income increases the share
of housing expenditures grows. This is partially due to the fact that housing is modeled as
a luxury good and the Engel curves are non linear. Although not reported in the paper,
we ﬁnd that when housing is less of a luxury good the eﬀects on house size are smaller.
The diﬀerence between the proportional tax system and the Conesa-Krueger tax structure
is partially related to the deduction of mortgage interest rates. Under a proportional income
tax, the marginal beneﬁt of buying a larger house with larger interest payments is zero. With
the C-K income tax code, the marginal beneﬁt is small but positive.
The progressivity of the income tax has quantitative eﬀects for the decision to supply
housing services to the rental market. The direction of these eﬀects depends on several
variables such as the rental price and the interest rate. Although not presented in the Table
9, the average size of rental property is closely related to average income. Under a less
progressive tax code, net average income increases between 6 and 7 percent, and average
consumption of rental-occupied housing increases between 10 to 30 percent.
A formal approach to evaluate the implications of diﬀerent progressivity of the tax code
is to conduct a welfare analysis. In order to measure changes in aggregate welfare associated
with diﬀerent tax code structures, we employ a consumption equivalent welfare approach
(CE). Given the speciﬁcation of the preferences, there is no close form solution to calculate
the consumption equivalence. As a result, we have to solve a nonlinear functional equation
F(W(c),W(cB),λ c)=0 , where λc denotes the consumption equivalence value, and where
W(c) represents the expected lifetime welfare of an agent being born into a stationary equi-
librium implied by the policy.17 We compute the welfare compensation by considering a con-
stant increase in goods consumption and housing services, F(W(c,d),W(cB,d B),λ cd)=0 .
This calculation is made to generate results that are comparable with Conesa and Krueger
(2006) ﬁndings. Their model has only one argument, consumption goods, in the preference
function. Reductions in the amount of progressivity in the income tax increases welfare by
4.5 percent in terms of consumption equivalence, and 4.1 percent when the compensation
includes goods consumption and housing. By contrary, an increase in the marginal tax rate
reduces welfare between 3.4 to 3.7 percent. The optimal progressivity increases welfare but
not as much as the proportional income tax.
The ﬁndings in this section highlight two important results associated with a reduction in
marginal tax rates. First, the welfare gains associated with a change in the progressivity of
the income tax are much larger than the gains reported in Conesa and Krueger (2006). They
ﬁnd that implementing the optimal progressivity increases welfare around 1 percent. Our
result suggests that these eﬀects are ampliﬁed in the presence of housing. The main reason
is that the reduction in the marginal tax rate reduces the asymmetries in the tax treatment





where the value function of a new born with no asset or mortgage holding obligation is weighted by the
unconditional probability of the idiosyncratic productivity shock.
27between owner-occupied and rental housing, and eliminates the incentive to purchase large
homes. Since housing becomes relatively less attractive, households choose to invest in the
productive sector. Aggregate output and consumption increases. In an economy with a single
asset this portfolio reallocation mechanism is absent, and the eﬃciency gains are only due
to consumption smoothing and changes in the labor supply. The second important ﬁnding
is that the asymmetries in the tax treatment of housing can be magniﬁed in the presence of
nonlinear income tax. For example, an increase in the marginal tax rate magniﬁes the eﬀects
of the tax provisions that beneﬁt homeownership, and reduce the aggregate ownership rate.
In contrast, a reduction in the marginal tax rate reduces the eﬀective asymmetries resulting
in an increase in the homeownership rate. These eﬀects become more obvious as we discuss
the distributional eﬀects of income taxation for housing consumption which are summarized
in Table 10.
Table 10: Distributional Eﬀects Progressivity Income Tax and Housing
Variable Sqft. Owners
b y I n c o m e Q u i n t i l e s Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 5
Benchmark 2,239 2,197 2,773 3,887 4,242
No Progressivity 2,432 2,237 2,923 3,899 4,288
% change (8.6) (1.8) (5.4) (0.3) (1.1)
More Progressivity 2,068 2,222 2,660 3,840 4,318
% change (-7.6) (1.1) (-4.1) (-1.2) (1.8)
C-K Optimal Progressivity 2,386 2,361 3,045 4,116 4,622
% change (6.6) (7.5) (9.8) (5.9) (9.0)
by Age Cohorts 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Benchmark 2,147 2,297 2,429 2,514 2,362
No Progressivity 2,279 2,313 2,497 2,741 2,635
% change (6.1) (0.7) (2.8) (9.0) (11.6)
More Progressivity 2,233 2,313 2,451 2,325 2,057
% change (4.0) (0.7) (0.9) (-7.5) (-12.9)
C-K Optimal Progressivity 2,337 2,401 2,550 2,731 2,603
% change (8.8) (4.5) (5.0) (8.6) (10.2)
Welfare CE(λcd)|CE(λc)
20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
No Progressivity 2.9|3.1 6.3|7.3 6.9|8.1 7.6|9.1 6.3|7.3
More Progressivity -2.3|-2.5 -5.2|-5.8 -6.0|-6.8 -6.1|-6.9 -7.0|-7.7
C-K Optimal Progressivity 2.1|2.3 5.1|5.9 5.7|6.7 6.5|7.7 5.4|6.2
The model ﬁnds that the changes in house size are asymmetric in all the experiments.
For example, with a proportional tax system the increase in average house size for the
lowest income quintile is 8.6 percent, 5.4 percent for the third, and 1.1 percent for the
highest income. This pattern is due to the behavior of retired households. Many of these
individuals receive a large share of their income from assets and rental property, and they
prefer to maintain a more stable relationship between the consumption of housing and goods.
Households in lower tax brackets choose to bias consumption towards housing. We observe
that household’s in the highest income decile response positively to changes in the degree
of progressivity. A tax code with lower progressivity allows these individuals beneﬁtf r o m
a larger income which oﬀsets the loss of beneﬁts from the mortgage deduction. Under a
more progressive tax code with larger marginal tax rates, households choose to bias there
consumption toward the consumption of goods. The model predicts both eﬀects to be
28approximately one percent. However, the combination of high income with the optimal
progressivity maximizes the impact of housing consumption for this group. The percent
change of housing consumption over the life cycle also varies across individuals in a non-
trivial manner. This is a result of the interaction between changes in labor and nonlabor
income over the life-cycle pattern of accumulation. In all three experiments, individuals
that have the highest responsiveness to the tax code are retired households as well as the
youngest age cohort. This is partially due to the income eﬀects associated to the relatively
low taxation faced by these groups of individuals. The middle age individuals bear higher
marginal tax rates and their response is smaller. The changes in progressivity maintain the
hump-shaped behavior of housing consumption, but the response to changes in the degree
of progressivity has a u-shaped pattern.
The ﬁnal section of the table discusses the welfare gains by age groups. The ﬁrst number
considers a welfare compensation of consumption goods and housing services, whereas the
second only considers the consumption goods compensation. We observe that the welfare
gains aﬀect households by diﬀerent magnitudes. Despite the reduction in average home size
for households between age 35 and 74 in the proportional tax case, the welfare increase is
quantitatively signiﬁcant. Following the same logic, these are the individuals that receive the
largest losses, in addition to the oldest cohort, when the income tax schedule becomes more
progressive. Despite the increase in the average owner-occupied house size these individuals
are worse oﬀ than in the baseline economy. The results suggest that the individuals that
take advantage of the asymmetric treatment of owner-occupied housing also beneﬁtt h em o s t
with its eﬀective elimination through tax incentives.18 T h ew e l f a r eg a i n sf r o mt h eh o u s i n g
provisions in the tax code has the lowest impact in the younger cohorts, since the impact in
the average house size is relatively small.
4.2 Asymmetries in the Tax Treatment of Housing
4.2.1 Taxation of Owner-Occupied Housing Service Flows
Many economists argue that the primary distortion in the current tax code is the treat-
ment of housing services. Under the cuurent tax code, income from the rental of housing
services is subject to taxation, but the implicit income from owner-occupied housing is not
subject to taxation. This policy introduces an asymmetry between the tax treatment of
owners and landlords that favors the consumption of owner-occupied housing services while
reducing the incentive to supply rental property. The implications of this asymmetry has
been studied in the literature. Rosen and Rosen (1980) estimate the eﬀects of excluding
imputed rents of owner-occupied housing, the deductibility of property taxes and mortgage
interest payments on tenure decisions. They ﬁnd that if all beneﬁts from ownership are
eliminated, the proportion of homeowners would drop about 4 basis points. Using a gen-
eral equilibrium framework where income is exogeneous, Berkovic and Fullerton (1992) ﬁnd
that average housing consumption would reduce between 3 and 6 percent. More recently,
Gervais (2002), who employs an overlapping generations general equilibrium model, ﬁnds
that taxing imputed rents of owner-occupied housing would increase the stock of business
18These tax provisions towards housing are still in place. However, when the marginal tax rate is zero
homeowners loss of the tax beneﬁts of choosing a larger dwelling. This is the case since the marginal tax
rate does not depend on higher interest mortgage payments, and the failure to tax the implicit rental income
from owner-occupied housing is irrelevant.
29capital over six percent as well as decreasing the stock of housing eight percent. The eﬀect
on homeownership is not discussed.
Our framework oﬀers some advantages over the existing literature. In contrast with
Rosen and Rosen (1980), and Berkovic and Fullerton (1992), housing is both a consumption
and an investment good. Income is endogenously determines in the model. With respect
to Gervais (2002) and Nakajima (2003), we allow labor income risk and allow the supply of
rental housing services to be endogenously determined. In our formulation we can address
the impact of taxing services ﬂows for housing tenure, housing consumption, and the supply
of rental property.
The asymmetry in the tax treatment between homeowners and landlords with respect
to the taxation of housing services is clear if the ﬁrst order conditions from the household’s
optimization problem are once again examined. For those individuals that pay the ﬁxed cost
  to become a landlord, their decision is determined by:
Ud
Uc
= R(1 − κrT
0(ay)) + p[T
0(ay)δr − 4δ].
The terms on the right hand side capture the tax treatment of housing services and the
deduction of maintenance expenses. This expression shows that the failure to tax housing
services reduces the eﬀective cost of owner-occupied housing. This wedge introduces a bias
towards owner-occupied housing. When the imputed rental income from owner-occupied
h o u s i n gi st a x e da tt h es a m er a t ea sr e n t a lh o u s i n g ,t h e nt h i sa s y m m e t r yw o u l db ee l i m i n a t e d .
The second term on the right hand side focuses on the wedge introduced by the asymmetric
treatment of maintenance expenses. When owner and rental occupied housing services are
taxed at the same rate, (κr =1 ) , the ﬁrst-order condition reduces to:
Ud
Uc
= R − p4δ + pT
0(ay)δr.
The remaining asymmetry arises from the treatment of maintenance expenses The term p4δ
lowers the opportunity cost of owner-occupied housing and reduces the incentives to supply
rental housing. However, the tax term increases the opportunity cost since landlords give up
the deduction from rental maintenance expenses. The importance of these two eﬀects will
vary with income levels.
We employ the model to measure the quantitative importance of these asymmetries.
We consider the case where the imputed income of the service ﬂows from owner-occupied
housing, (measured as Rd), is fully taxable so that κo = κr =1 . Table 11 summarizes the
aggregate implications of this policy change relative to the the benchmark economy.
Table 11: Taxation of Owner-Occupied Housing Services
Interest Rate Rental Price Ownership
(% change) Aggregate Under 34 Income Q1
Benchmark 5.44% - 63.7 33.1 32.0
Tax Services 5.21% -1.83 66.9 35.5 34.46
Gini After Tax Avg. Avg. Rental Mass Welfare
Income/Wealth Owner Size Supply Landlords λcd|λc
Benchmark 0.241/0.531 2,348 1,310 17.07 -
Tax Services 0.244/0.527 2,381 1,323 19.25 4.3|4.7
30In terms of prices, the taxation of owner-occupied housing services results in a twenty-
three basis point decline in the interest rate and a 1.83 percent decline in the rental rate.
The interest rate impact suggests that households are redirecting resources from housing
to business capital, thus reducing part of the crowding-out eﬀect associated with the tax
asymmetry. However, the taxation of the imputed rental income of owner-occupied housing
provides an additional source of revenue. Under our assumption that tax policy should
b er e v e n u en e u t r a l ,t h ea v e r a g ea n dm a r g i n a lt a xr a t ec a nb er e d u c e d . T h er e d u c t i o ni n
taxation combined with an increase in average net income of one percent generates an small
increase in the consumption of owner-occupied housing from 2,348 to 2,381 square feet. The
1.4 percent increase in housing consumption contrasts with the decline (3 to 6 percent)
predicted by Berkovic and Fullerton (1992). We also ﬁnd the aggregate ownership rate
and the ownership rate for households under age 35 increases 5.0 percent and 7.5 percent,
respectively. These results diﬀers from Rosen and Rosen (1980) who predict a reduction
in the aggregate ownership rate. Gervais’ assumptions about the rental market prevents a
direct measurement of the eﬀects of this policy on ownership. None of these papers measure
the impact for the supply of rental property or the consumption impacts for renters. The
elimination of the asymmetric treatment of housing increases the fraction of landlords and
generates incentives to supply more rental property. This increase occurs despite a two
percent reduction in the rental price and is due the reduction in marginal tax rates.
Figure 2: Asymmetries Tax Treatment of Housing












































Figure 2 examines the implied marginal tax rates if owner-occupied housing services are
taxed. The solid line presents the marginal tax rates from our benchmark model where
GS tax structure is employed, and owner-occupied housing services are not taxed. If the
imputed rental income from owner occupied housing is taxable and the assumption of revenue
neutrality is maintained, the marginal tax rate is reduced over all income levels. This explains
why landlords receive higher after tax rental income, despite lower rental rates. In addition,
the average rental size increases by twenty-four percent.
The distributional implications of taxing owner-occupied housing services are presented
in Table 12. The average consumption of owner-occupied housing increases over all income
31quintiles and in almost age groups, but the eﬀect is not symmetric. The key factor is that
even though all the marginal tax rates are scale down, the change in the deﬁnition of taxable
income puts some households in a higher tax bracket. Thus most groups do not experience
the same change in housing consumption. For example, we ﬁnd that for the lowest income
quintiles the increase is around 4.0 percent, whereas for the highest income quintiles ranges
between 0.5 and 3.5 percent. If we consider life-cycle eﬀects, the eﬀects are more uniform
with the exception of the second cohort and this age group maintains their housing size.
In sum, the elimination of the asymmetry in the tax treatment between owner and rental
occupied housing eliminates an unnecessary wedge in the economy that in conjunction with
revenue neutrality should imply no reduction in housing consumption. The response of this
policy depends on the strength of income eﬀects that results in higher consumption of housing
services. Welfare increases over all cohorts. The smallest beneﬁt occur in the youngest age
cohorts.
Table 12: Distributional Eﬀects Taxation of Owner-Occupied Housing Services
Variable Sqft. Owners
b y I n c o m e Q u i n t i l e s Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 5
Benchmark 2,239 2,197 2,773 3,887 4,242
Tax Services 2,331 2,206 2,860 3,905 4,390
Percent Change 4.1 0.4 3.1 0.5 3.5
by Age Cohorts 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Benchmark 2,147 2,297 2,429 2,514 2,362
Tax Services 2,226 2,292 2,432 2,616 2,464
Percent Change 3.7 -0.2 0.1 4.1 4.3
Welfare CE(λcd)|CE(λc)
20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Tax Services 3.8/4.1 5.0/5.7 5.0/5.8 5.7/6.8 4.9/5.6
The distributional results substantially diﬀer from those of Berkovic and Fullerton (1992).
They found welfare losses for some individuals. Their ﬁn d i n gi sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a tb e n e ﬁts
from the reduction in the marginal tax rates do not oﬀs e tt h ec o s to fm o v i n gi n t oah i g h e r
tax bracket as taxable income increases. We do not observe this because of the important
life cycle eﬀects and the recognition that housing is an investment good.
4.2.2 The home mortgage interest deduction
One of the hallmarks of U.S. housing policy is the deductibility of mortgage interest pay-
ments for those households who itemize. This deduction creates an incentive to both own
and consume more housing. The view among practitioners is that the removal of the interest
deduction would result in less owner occupied housing consumption and thus smaller home
sizes. Homeownership would be lower since the incentives to own have been reduced. Under
revenue neutrality, the elimination of the deduction should result in a tax reduction. This
eﬀect is often ignored. Rosen (1979) and Rosen and Rosen (1980) are among of the ﬁrst to
examine the quantitative impact of the removal of this deduction. They ﬁnd the homeown-
ership rate would decline by four basis points. They do point out that their results could be
somewhat biased as housing only serves as a consumption good and has no investment role.
32They also ignore the equilibrium and the taxation eﬀects associated to the elimination of
this deduction. More recently, Gervais (2002) employs a general equilibrium life-cycle model
where housing is both a consumption and investment good. In his model, the tax system
introduces a wedge that makes owning preferable to renting. He ﬁnds that the elimination
of the mortgage interest deduction under the assumption of revenue neutrality would reduce
the aggregate homeownership by 4.2 basis points.
We use our model to measure the impact on ownership and housing consumption when
mortgage interest payments are no longer deductible. Table 13 summarizes the eﬀect on the
main economic aggregates. We ﬁnd that the elimination of this deduction has a positive
eﬀect on ownership. The aggregate ownership and the ownership for households under
age 35 increases around one basis point. The small magnitude is a consequence of the
revenue neutrality assumption. For the marginal household, the reduction in their tax bracket
essentially keeps their after tax income unchanged. For younger households, the increase
in the price of rental housing makes owning a relatively more attractive option. When
combined with the income eﬀect accompanying the tax reduction, the homeownership rate
for younger households increases. This result contrasts with the ﬁndings of Rosen and Rosen
(1980) and Gervais (2002) who ﬁnd a large negative impact in homeownership. Our ﬁnding
provides quantitative support to Glaesser and Shapiro’s (2002) conjecture that the mortgage
deduction has very small impact in home ownership.
Table 13: Elimination Mortgage Deduction
Interest Rate Rental Price Ownership
(% change) Aggregate Under 34 Income Q1
Benchmark 5.44% - 63.7 33.1 32.0
No Deduction 5.38 (-1.16) 0.28 64.7 33.9 33.2
Gini After Tax Avg. Avg. Rental Mass Welfare
Income/Wealth Owner Size Supply Landlords λcd|λc
Benchmark 0.241/0.531 2,348 1,310 17.07 -
No Deduction 0.241/0.529 2,346 1,314 17.72 1.3|1.4
The elimination of the mortgage interest deduction reduces the consumption of owner-
occupied housing, but this reduction is very small. The increase in the price of rental
housing generates a 3.8 percent increase in the fraction of homeowners that choose to become
a landlord and the average number of square feet supplied. The elimination of the home
mortgage interest deduction causes the marginal buyer to have higher income and wealth thus
increasing ownership but consuming slightly smaller homes. On the other hand, the marginal
household that is forced into rental property has more income and wealth as compared to the
household who was a renter in the benchmark case. Hence, they can aﬀord larger dwellings.
T h eq u a n t i t a t i v ee ﬀects to the elimination are tied to the fact that the average gross income
only increases by 0.3 percent, and the marginal tax rates (see Figure 2) are reduced by
a smaller magnitude than compared to the taxation of owner-occupied housing services.
Despite the reduction in housing consumption, welfare increases 1.3 percent compared to
the benchmark economy. It is important to stress that in this model the interest rate and
the rental price are not linked by an arbitrage condition as in Gervais (2002). The increase
in the rental price, the decrease of the interest rate, and the reduction in marginal tax rates
33account for the diﬀerence in our results from other studies.19
In principle, one would think that the relatively small price movements that we observe
would make partial equilibrium analysis appropriate. In order to examine this possibility,
we solve the model holding prices at the benchmark level and ignore the income eﬀects
associated to the revenue neutral assumption. In this case we ﬁnd a larger negative eﬀect
in ownership rates as the aggregate ownership rate falls from 63.7 percent in the benchmark
case to 60.4 percent when the deduction is removed. The homeownership rate for younger
households falls from 37.5 percent to 33.5 percent (these results are not displayed in the
Table 13). Under these restrictive assumptions, we ﬁnd that approximately 5 percent of the
homeowners in the economy own because of the existence of the mortgage deduction. Rosen
and Rosen’s (1980) partial equilibrium analysis implies a 6 percent change. The similar
magnitude suggests that the more restrictive assumption in Rosen and Rosen is the holding
of prices and taxation eﬀects constant.20
Another issue is whether the mortgage deduction allows high earning households to pur-
chase larger houses. The distributional eﬀects of eliminating this provision in the tax code
a r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e1 4 .W h e ne x a m i n i n gh o u s es i z eb yi n c o m ea n da g ec o h o r t s ,w eﬁnd
that the average house size decreases in all cases except one, but the quantitative eﬀects are
very small. In most cases the reduction in housing consumption ranges between 0.5 to 2.0
percent. This policy aﬀects households housing tenure and investment decisions along diﬀer-
ent dimensions. High income and wealthy households loose the ability to use the mortgage
deduction to reduce the marginal tax rate. In addition, the redeﬁnition of taxable income
places some of young households in a higher tax bracket. As a result these individuals end
up buying smaller homes, but the eﬀects are quantitatively very small. Nevertheless, for the
other income and age groups the reduction in the marginal tax rate compensates them for
the removal of the mortgage deduction and housing consumption increases. In general, we
ﬁnd that the elimination of the mortgage interest deduction has very small but asymmetric
implication for average consumption of owner-occupied housing.
19This result crucially depends on the response of the rental rate. If the interest rate and the rental
price, the elimination of the mortgage deduction should reduce both at the same rate. The combined
equilibrium eﬀects of lower prices for rental housing and a less favouring tax treatment implies a reduction
in homeownership. For example, Gervais (2002) ﬁnds that the elimination of the deduction reduces the
aggregate ownership rate in 5.7 percent. However, when these two prices are not directly related the eﬀects
in homeownership are diﬀerent.
20In this model all homeowners deduct mortgage interest payments. In the U.S. tax code only a fraction
of the homeowners itemize. If we allow households to choose the standard deduction, the impact of the
removal of this provision would be somewhat smaller, but they would be clearly bounded below by the
partial equilibrium ﬁndings.
34Table 14 Distributional Eﬀects Eliminating Mortgage Deduction
Variable Sqft. Owners
b y I n c o m e Q u i n t i l e s Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 5
Benchmark 2,239 2,197 2,773 3,887 4,242
No Deduction 2,275 2,199 2,807 3,966 4,232
Percent Change 1.61 0.09 1.22 2.03 -0.23
by Age Cohorts 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Benchmark 2,147 2,297 2,429 2,514 2,362
No Deduction 2,146 2,297 2,416 2,527 2,363
Percent Change -0.05 0 -0.5 0.52 0.04
Welfare CE(λcd)/CE(λc)
20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Tax Services 1.1/1.2 1.6/1.8 1.6/1.9 1.6/1.8 1.9/2.1
From an aggregate perspective, welfare increases by 1.3 percent. The welfare implications
of this policy change are presented in the bottom portion of Table 14. The distributional
eﬀects of eliminating this tax provision are similar for individuals age 35 and above. The
younger cohorts have the smallest welfare increase. This is a direct consequence of two
factors. Approximately two thirds of these individuals are renters and do not beneﬁtf r o m
the deduction. In addition, the marginal tax rate is relatively low since their income does
not change much. To obtain a larger eﬀect for these individuals, housing policies may have
to be directed toward renters.
5 Housing Policy: Individual Housing Accounts and
Tax Credits
In this section, we use the model to illustrate the implications of policies designed to beneﬁt
a particular segment or group in the economy. We show that housing policy can increase
the ownership rate of a particular segment of the population, but generates non-trivial dis-
tributional costs in terms of welfare. We consider two diﬀerent housing policies designed to
reduced the diﬃculty that some families have in accumulating a downpayment. The ﬁrst
policy is related to Olsen’s (2006) proposal for a housing voucher program for low income
households. This proposal allows households that can aﬀord the mortgage payments, but
have insuﬃcient resources to accumulate the downpayment to enter into homeownership.
We consider a policy that gives homeowners a tax credit that covers some percentage of the
downpayment requirement as a way to mitigate the burden of the downpayment constraint.
The second policy considers the eﬀects of implementing Individual Housing Accounts (IHA).
This policy is motivated by policies in Europe where individuals who are not homeowners
can take advantage of tax sheltered individual housing accounts (IHA’s) that are intended
to be savings vehicles for the accumulation of the downpayment. The IHA’s accounts are
similar to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA’s). The idea is that both the principal and
the interest payments in an IHA would be exempt from progressive income taxation. This
policy would be limited to current renters with the intent to stimulate ownership. In prin-
35cipal this policy does not have an age restriction, but it could be restricted only to young
families.
The eﬀectiveness of both policies towards ownership is an open question. Critics argue
that while the policy chould shorten the time period that families need to save up for the
downpayment, the impact of either policy might be small as many low income households will
have problems meeting regular mortgage payments. In addition, these policies can introduce
important distortions into the portfolio allocations of renters.
We employ the model to evaluate these two policies. The implementation of the ﬁrst
policy works by giving a tax credit that amounts to 50 percent the downpayment for a house
of size, h, while the second proposal allows a tax sheltered individual savings accounts for the
individuals who are not homeowners and are under the age of 35.21 In the experiments we
maintain the existing tax code (i.e. interest deductions) and impose the revenue neutrality
assumption. The results from these experiments are presented in Table 15.
Table 15: Aggregate Eﬀects of Individual Housing Accounts
Interest Rate Rental Price Ownership
(% change) Aggregate Under 35 Income Q1
Benchmark 5.44% - 63.7 33.1 32.0
IHA 5.15(-5.4) -1.3 69.0 30.0 39.1
Tax Credit 5.31(-2.6) 5.9 68.9 40.9 31.45
Gini Avg. Avg. Rental Mass Welfare
Income/Wealth Owner Size Supply Landlords λcd|λc
Benchmark 0.241/0.531 2,348 1,310 17.1 -
IHA 0.243/0.531 2,426 1,191 16.5 4.3/4.8
Tax Credit 0.245/0.537 2,620 1,104 10.0 0.2/0.3
The introduction of Individual Housing Accounts results in a large increase in the aggre-
gate homeownership rate. This increase might appear surprising since the homeownership
rate for households under age 35 falls from 33.1 percent to 30.0 percent. For households in
this age cohort, the IHA’s creates an incentive to save rather than invest in housing. As a
result, this age group delays their participation into market. The aggregate increase in the
participation rate is due to the increase in the ownership rate in the other cohorts. The par-
ticipation rate for households between age 35 and 49 increases by 15 percent. The reduction
i nt h ei n t e r e s tr a t ef o l l o w sf r o mt h ei n c r e a s ei ns a v i n g sg e n e r a t e db yt h i sp r o g r a m ,a n dt h e
crowding-out eﬀect for business capital due to the ﬁnancing of housing is reduced. The com-
bination of an increase in household savings and lower interest rates partially accounts for
a 3.3 percent increase in house size. Under this policy, the equilibrium rental price is lower
and the fraction of individuals that choose to become landlords falls. The average rental
unit is smaller. Overall, both aggregate welfare and welfare for each age cohort increases.
Disaggregate welfare measures are presented in Table 16.
21Since the state space in the model is rather large, we abstract from introducing an additional asset that
is subject to a diﬀerent tax treatment where the proceedings of the asset are only used to purchase a house.
We make some shortcut simpliﬁcations by assuming that savings of households of age 35 and less are not
taxed. That would be equivalent to assume IHA where withdrawing the money to not purchase a house is
not penalized. However, we think this assumption might increase the changes for households that receive
negative income shocks to purchase a house.
36Table 16 Welfare Distributional Eﬀects
Welfare CE(λcd)/CE(λc)
by Age Cohorts 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
IHA 4.0/4.3 5.0/5.7 4.9/5.7 5.1/6.0 3.1/3.6
Tax Credit 0.2/0.3 0.7/0.8 -0.4/-0.5 -0.4/-0.5 -1.8/-2.1
The introduction of a tax credit for one-half the downpayment on the purchase of a
minimum size house also results in a large increase in the aggregate homeownership as
the rate increases 5.2 basis points. The policy successfully increases the participation rate
for ﬁrst time buyers, (i.e., households under age 35) from 33.1 percent to 40.9 percent.
Since the entry cost into the housing market is reduced, individuals spend more on housing.
The average house size increases by roughly twelve percent. The combined eﬀect of the
increase in ownership and larger housing units generates a revenue deﬁcit derived from the
number of individuals using the tax credit and the mortgage deduction. To maintain revenue
neutrality, the average and marginal income tax must increase. This is clearly seen in Figure
3 where the marginal tax rates are clearly greater that those in the benchmark economy. The
implementation of tax credits has a marginal increase in aggregate welfare. However, as can
be seen in Table 16, welfare does not increase over all age cohort. While welfare increases
for the youngest age cohorts, welfare declines for the oldest age cohorts. For these latter age
cohorts, the marginal tax rates have increases, and smaller amounts of housing services are
consumed. The overall eﬀect of the policy is clearly redistributive.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we analyze the eﬀects of the asymmetric tax treatment of homeowners and
landlords. We construct a quantitative general equilibrium overlapping generations model
that stresses tenure choice (renting vs. owning), housing investment decisions (ﬁnancial
assets vs. housing), and the decision to supply rental housing services. We present empirical
evidence from the Property Owners and Managers Survey that indicates that modeling the of
the rental supply decision should be at the household level. We also show that this modeling
strategy eliminates the possibility of reducing the rental supply to an arbitrage condition. As
a result, the rental supply response is critically aﬀected by the interaction of the progressivity
of the income tax code, and the implicit magnitude of the moral hazard eﬀect measured by
the spread between the maintenance cost of owner and rental occupied housing.
The model predicts a negative and quantitatively signiﬁcant relationship between the
progressivity of the income tax and ownership and housing consumption. Our ﬁndings
suggest that the asymmetries in the tax treatment of housing can be aﬀected by the presence
of nonlinear taxation. For example, the model suggest that the impact of these asymmetries
are minimized with a less progressive system which increases welfare. Interestingly, we ﬁnd
that the individuals that take advantage of the asymmetric treatment of owner-occupied
housing also beneﬁtt h em o s tw i t hi t se ﬀective elimination. In addition, we also ﬁnd that
the welfare gains associated with a change the progressivity of the income tax are much larger
than the gains reported in Conesa and Krueger (2006). This suggests that the importance
of income tax reforms are ampliﬁed in the presence of housing and indicate that taxation
and savings issues should not be considered in an environment that abstracts from housing.
37With respect to the elimination of the asymmetries in the tax treatment of housing, we
ﬁnd that the taxation of the imputed rental income from owner-occupied housing has a very
small eﬀect in housing consumption but increases the aggregate ownership rate of 3.2 basis
points. The distributional eﬀects in housing consumption and welfare are not symmetric
across households. With respect the other asymmetry, we ﬁnd that the elimination of the
mortgage deduction has a small but positive eﬀect in homeownership. This result is a
consequence of the supply response of rental property that is disconnected from the interest
rate and the revenue neutral assumption. The model predicts a no eﬀects in the average
house size and very small distributional eﬀects. Finally, we explore the quantitative impact
of the introduction of tax sheltered individual housing accounts (IHA) and tax credit for
the downpayment. We ﬁnd that these policies can be eﬀective to foster owner-occupied
housing, but the welfare implications can be very diﬀerent. For example, the tax credit only
increases the welfare of the relatively young families that have diﬃculties to accumulate the
downpayment at the expense of the other households. However, IHA foster an increase in
the aggregate level of savings that reduces the interest rate and generates sizeable welfare
gains across all households.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Stationary Equilibrium
In the model economy, we restrict ourselves to stationary equilibria. The individual state
variables are asset holdings, a, housing investment holdings, h, mortgage status, n,l a b o r
productivity status,  , and age j. The aggregate state of the economy at time t is completely
described by the joint measure Φ over asset positions, housing investment positions, mortgage
status, productivity state, and age where Λ =( a,h,n, ,j). Let a ∈ R+,h∈ R+,n∈
N =( 1 ,2,...,N), ∈ E = { 1,  2,  3,  4,  5},j∈ J =( 1 ,2,...,J), and let S = R+ × R+ ×
N×E×J. Let B(R+) be the Borel σ−algebra of R+, and P(N), P(E), P(J) the power
sets of N,E,and J, respectively. Let M be the set of all ﬁnite measures over the measurable
space (S,B(R+) × B(R+) × P(N) × P(E) × P(J)).
Deﬁnition (Stationary Equilibrium): Let Is(Λ) be an indicator value that is equal
to one when the housing investment position is sold and zero otherwise, Io be an indica-
tor function that is equal to one if the household has a positive housing investment po-
sition and zero otherwise, and Ic be an indicator function that is equal to one if h does
not equal h0 and zero otherwise. Given a set of time-invariant ﬁscal policy arrangements
{G,τy(η0,η 1,η 2),τ p(θ)}, and initial conditions, a stationary equilibrium is a collection of
value functions, v(a,h,z,n, ,j,): A×H×Z×M×E×J → R; and decision rules for the
household,{a0,h 0,z0,c,d: S → R+} if Is =0or {a0
ξ,h 0
ξ,z0
ξ,c ξ,d ξ : S → R+} if Is =1 ,a g g r e -
gate outcomes {K,N}; prices {r,p,R,rm}; stationary population and invariant distribution
Φ(a,h,z,n, ,j) such that
391. Given prices, {r,p,R,rm}, policies, transfers, and initial conditions, the value function
v and decision rules c, s, a0, and h0 solve the recursive formulation of consumer’s
problem as speciﬁed by
















0 + IoIc[(φb + χ)ph
0 + m(z
0,p,h
0)] + (1 − Ic)Iom(z,p,h)+Iox(h
0,d)+( 1− Io)Rd =
y − T(e y)+Ic[(1 − φs)pξh − D(z,p,h)]
c,s,a
0,h
0 ≥ 0 and s ≤ g(h
0).
where n0 =m a x {N − 1,0}.
2. The social security program is self-ﬁnancing with the tax rate determined by equation
(5).
3. The general government balances as speciﬁed by equation (6).
4. Transfers are deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 7 ) .
5. The asset market is deﬁned by equation (8) clears.
6. The rental market as deﬁn e db ye q u a t i o n( 9 )c l e a r s .
7. The goods market condition is deﬁned as:
C + K
0 − (1 − δ)K + IH + G + Υ = F(K,N)
where C, K0 −(1−δ)K, IH, G, Υ represent aggregate consumption expenditures, ag-
gregate investment in ﬁxed capital, aggregate investment in housing goods, government








































































8. The labor market clears where labor demand, as determined by the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order
condition, is equal to labor supply.







and T be consistent with individual decisions. We will restrict ourselves to equilibria
which satisfy:
Φ
0 = T(Φ)
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